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ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance against eavesdropping of a land mobile
satellite (LMS) system, where the satellite employs the spot beam technique, and both the terrestrial user
and eavesdropper are equipped with multiple antennas and utilize maximal ratio combining to receive the
confidential message. Specifically, in terms of the availability of the eavesdropper’s CSI at the satellite,
we consider both passive (Scenario I) and active (Scenario II) eavesdropping. For Scenario I where the
eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) is unknown to the satellite, closed-form expressions for
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability are derived. Furthermore,
expressions for the asymptotic secrecy outage probability are also presented to reveal the secrecy diversity
order and array gain of the considered system. For Scenario II where the eavesdropper’s CSI is available at
the satellite, novel expressions for the exact and asymptotic average secrecy capacity are obtained. Based on
a simple asymptotic formula, we can characterize the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) slope and high SNR
power offset of the LMS systems. Finally, simulations are provided to validate our theoretical analysis and
show the effect of different parameters on the system performance.
INDEX TERMS Secrecy performance analysis, satellite communication, multi-antenna, shadowed-Rican
fading.
I. INTRODUCTION
Land mobile satellite (LMS) systems have been widely
applied in broadcasting, navigation, and disaster relief, due
to their potential for providing wide-area coverage and high
data transmission rate, especially in situations where the
deployment of wired and wireless terrestrial networks is not
economically viable [1]. Due to the economical or implemen-
tal advantages, LMS systems can provide various telecom-
munications and multimedia mobile satellite service (MSS).
Over the recent years, substantial effort has been done
on the optimization design and performance analysis of
LMS systems. Specifically, a generic optimization problem
for LMS systems was proposed in [2] to handle the data
rate with general linear and nonlinear power constraints.
Christopoulos et al. [3] addressed the frame-based precoding
problem within multibeam satellite networks. In addition,
various performancemetrics, including outage probability [4]
and average symbol error rate [5] have been investigated for
LMS systems with a single antenna. However, since multi-
antenna technology has been widely recognized as an effec-
tive means of providing increased diversity and high system
capacity [6], the incorporation of multi-antenna techniques
into satellite communication systems have recently received
much attention [7]–[9].
Despite the benefits of immense coverage area, the inher-
ent broadcast nature of LMS systems make themselves prone
to be eavesdropped by illegitimate users [10]. In this regard,
privacy and security problem in satellite communications
has received significant attentions. Traditionally, this kind
of problem can be solved by the upper layers with the
use of cryptographic protocols, i.e., the advanced encryp-
tion standard [11]. Nevertheless, the performance of current
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cryptographic schemes, which rely on the limited compu-
tational power of the eavesdropper, have become increas-
ingly uncertain, since the computational ability of potential
eavesdroppers is becoming more powerful [12]. Besides the
cryptographic protocol in the upper layers, physical layer
security (PLS) has been introduced to strengthen the
secure transmission of wireless communications using an
information-theoretic perspective [13], [14]. The key phi-
losophy of physical layer security is to exploit the differ-
ent characteristics of the channels to the desired user and
eavesdropper. Specifically, Wyner [15] have done the foun-
dation work for modern physical layer security. One seminal
conclusion can be made from [15] was that a perfect secure
transmission can be achieved if the quality of the legitimate
user was superior to that of the eavesdropper.
Moreover, an eavesdropping environment can be classified
in a passive or active eavesdropping scenario according to
the transmitter knows the CSI of the eavesdropper or not.
Until now, several works have been devoted to study the
security performance in diverse scenarios, such as the work
in [16] and [17]. Yang et al. [18] investigated the probability
for non-zero capacity and secrecy outage probability of the
multiple antenna wiretap channel with passive eavesdroppers
and assuming maximal ratio combining (MRC) and selec-
tion combining (SC) in the presence of Nakagami-m fading.
In [19], the secrecy outage probability of multiple antenna
wiretap channels using transmit antenna selection and gen-
eralized selection combining (TAS/GSC) at the receiver was
first studied for passive eavesdropping, and an extension to
active eavesdropping scenarios was also presented, in which
both the exact and asymptotic average secrecy capacity were
analyzed.
The above works mainly investigated the secure
performance in terrestrial scenarios. However, in satellite
communications, where a legitimate user also suffers from
wiretapping, limited work has been focused on physical layer
security [20]–[22]. In a multibeam environment, an opti-
mization power allocation problem was investigated in [20]
by satisfying individual secrecy rate requirements, while
the precoding problem was investigated in [21] under the
constraint of minimizing the total onboard power and meet-
ing individual secrecy rate demands. Moreover, the authors
in [22] studied the secure satellite communications with
network coding. In [23], a general construction of the wiretap
coding and its applicability for a typical satellite channel
were analyzed. Li et al. [24], [25] have proposed the joint
secure design in cognitive satellite terrestrial networks by
minimizing the transmit power with the leakage outage limit
for the eavesdropper.
The information-theoretic basics, such as probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity, secrecy outage probability,
secrecy capacity and etc, are the fundamentals for the appli-
cation of physical layer security in wireless communication
networks [26]. Thus far, existing work on physical layer
security in satellite systems has not focused on these related
key performance metrics. Due to the particular propagation
environments, LMS systems commonly suffer from multiple
levels of obstructions (e.g., urban, suburb, and rural scenar-
ios), thus the accuracy of both small- and largescale fading
statistics depending upon several factors should be carefully
considered. Because of the random channel fluctuations in
time varying LMS fading channels, an enhanced secrecy
performance can be opportunistically exploited depending on
the channel conditions.
In this paper, we consider that a LMS system communi-
cates with its legitimate user, while an unauthorized eaves-
dropper is present and tries to overhear. Then, we provide
a comprehensive secrecy performance analysis of the con-
sidered network over the Shadowed-Rician fading channel,
a model which was first proposed in [27] and has been
widely exploited in satellite communications. Specifically,
we assume that multiple antennas are equipped at the legit-
imate user and the eavesdropper, while the satellite employs
spot beam transmission, and we consider two scenarios for
detailed analysis, namely, Scenario I: passive eavesdropping,
where the satellite has no knowledge of the eavesdropper’s
CSI, and Scenario II: active eavesdropping, where the CSI
of the eavesdropper is available at the satellite.1 We analyze
the secrecy performance of the satellite systems by deriving
new theoretical formulas. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time such expressions are obtained.2 Our detailed
contributions can be outlined as follows:
• For Scenario I, since the transmitter has no information
about the eavesdropper’s channel, perfect secrecy cannot
be guaranteed, so exact closed-form expressions for the
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and average
secrecy outage probability are derived to evaluate the
secrecy performance [16].
• To gain further insights, simple asymptotic expressions
for the secrecy outage probability at the high SNR are
obtained to reveal the secrecy diversity order and secrecy
array gain. In particular, two representative cases are
employed, namely, Outside Beam Coverage (OBC): the
eavesdropper is outside the beam coverage area, and
Inside BeamCoverage (IBC): the eavesdropper is within
the beam coverage area. For OBC, we show that the
full secrecy diversity order can be achieved, which is
simply determined by the antenna configuration at the
legitimate user. On the other hand, for IBC, the secrecy
diversity order collapses to zero, indicating that increas-
ing the transmit power at the satellite does not provide
additional performance gain.
• For scenario II, the transmitter can adapt the trans-
mission rate according to the CSI of both the main
and eavesdropper’s channel to achieve perfect secure
1Scenario II is particularly applicable in multicast and unicast networks
where the users play dual roles as legitimate users for some signals and
eavesdroppers for others. This scenario has been studied in existing work
such as [26] and [28].
2The motivation of this paper is to provide the fundamental framework of
information-theoretic based physical layer security for satellite communica-
tion systems in terms of different eavesdropping scenarios.
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FIGURE 1. System model.
transmission. In this case, theoretical expressions for
the average secrecy capacity is provided as the as the
principle performance metric [19].
• The asymptotic average secrecy capacity is also derived
for both the OBC and IBC cases to show the high SNR
power offset and high SNR slope for the LMS systems.
For OBC, we show that the high SNR slope remains
one. For IBC, the average secrecy capacity approaches
a plateau, which means the high SNR power offset
degrades to zero. Moreover, the high SNR power offset
is dependent on the beam gain ratio of the legitimate user
and eavesdropper.
• Simulation results first show the joint impact of beam
radius and locations on the secrecy performance of LMS
systems. We observe that for a fixed distance between
the legitimate user and eavesdropper, a narrow beam
radius leads to enhanced secrecy performance.When the
eavesdropper is outside the beam coverage, the secrecy
performance of the LMS systems gradually fluctuates
with a certain range, and is irrelevant to the beam radius.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we describe the system model. In Section III,
we provide the statistical property of the satellite links. The
secrecy performance of the considered LMS system are ana-
lyzed for different scenarios in Sections IV and V, respec-
tively. Section VI shows the numerical results along with
discussions. Eventually, useful conclusions are drawn in
Section VII.
Notation:E [·] denotes the expectation operator,CM×N the
space of M × N complex matrices, |·| the absolute value,
‖·‖2F the Frobenius norm, NC (m, σ 2) the complex Gaussian
distribution with mean m and variance σ 2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As depicted in Fig. 1, we consider the downlink of a satellite
communication network exploiting a geostationary satellite
(Sat) with single antenna (a.k.a. feed) sends confidential
message to the legitimate user (Bob) with NB antennas in
the presence of an Eve with NE antennas attempting to over-
hear the satellite information signal in the same beam.3,4
We assume that the CSI of satellite links is available at the
gateway (GW), which can be realized by feedback/training
sent from the terminals via a return channel, which already
exists in current systems, such as DVB-S2 [2], [21].
A. SATELLITE CHANNEL MODEL
To realistically model the feature of satellite networks in
achieving physical layer security, the main characteristics of
satellite channels should be properly modeled. Specifically,
the composite fading distribution and on-board beam factor
are taken into consideration [24], [25].
The beam gain is determined by the on-board antenna
pattern and the position of a ground user. For the i-th receiver
within the satellite spot beam coverage area, the beam gain
can be approximated as [2]
b (ϕi) =
(
J1 (ui)
2ui
+ 36J3 (ui)
u3i
)2
, (1)
where ui is given by
ui = 2.07123 sinϕisinϕ3dB
, (2)
with ϕi representing the angle between the position of the i-th
receiver and the beam center, and ϕ3dB the angle correspond-
ing to the 3-dB powerloss, which are, respectively, given by
ϕi = arctan
(
di
D
)
, (3)
ϕ3dB = arctan
(
R
D
)
, (4)
where R is the beam’s radius, D the distance between the
satellite and i-th receiver, and di the distance between the
beam center and the i-th receiver. Since the distance between
the user and beam center is much smaller than the satellite
altitude, namely, di  D, the relative distance can be trans-
formed into [29]
ϕi ≈
di
R
, (5)
and we have
ui = 2.07123
di
R
. (6)
Besides the on-board beam pattern employed at the satel-
lite, our work on physical layer security is distinguished
3The motivation of the employed SIMO system is due to the fact that the
implementation of multiple antennas on a satellite, to fully exploit its channel
capabilities, is not a suitable choice, due to the lack of scatterers in its vicinity,
which is a common assumption in many existing works (see [6], [7] and the
reference therein).
4For scenarios with multiple legitimate users, the user scheduling scheme
should be further designed, which is an open topic beyond the interest in
this paper. Moreover, if multiple eavesdroppers are considered, the coopera-
tive or non-cooperative eavesdropping scenarios should be further discussed.
The study of these issues could be our future works.
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by use of the LMS channel model, which is different
from that typically assumed for terrestrial wireless systems.
Generally, satellite links are modeled by composite fading
distributions to describe more accurately the amplitude fluc-
tuation of the signal envelope. While various mathematical
models, such as Loo, Barts-Stutzman, and Karasawa et al.,
have been proposed to describe the satellite channel distri-
butions, the Shadowed-Rician (SR) model presented in [27]
has been recognized as the most commonly used one in ana-
lytical studies of LMS communication performance [4], [5],
[7]–[9]. Particularly, the SR model has found wide applica-
tions in different frequency bands such as the UHF-band,
L-band, S-band, and Ka-band [27]. In this model, elements
of the channel vector are identical independently distributed
(i.i.d) random variables described by
gi = g¯i + g˜i (7)
where the line-of-sight (LOS) component g¯i is composed
of i.i.d Nakagami-m random variables and the entries of
the scattering component g˜i follow an i.i.d Rayleigh fading
distribution. The SR channel links are denoted as gi ∼
SR
(
i, bi,mi
)
with i representing the average power of
the LoS component, 2bi the average power of the multipath
component, and mi the Nakagami-m parameter correspond-
ing to the severity of the fading. By combining the beam
gain coefficient in (1) and the channel fading vector in (7),
the overall satellite channel for i-th user can be modeled as
hi =
√
b (ϕi)gi. (8)
B. OUTPUT SINR
Let x (t) be the signal transmitted by the satellite to a legiti-
mate user with NB antennas. An eavesdropper with NE anten-
nas tries to illegally overhear the transmitted signal from the
satellite. Denoting hB ∈ CNB×1 and hE ∈ CNE×1 as the chan-
nel vectors for the Sat-Bob and Alice-Eve links, the received
signals at Bob and Eve at time t can be respectively expressed
as
yB (t) =
√
PwHB
(
hBx (t)+ nB (t)
)
(9)
yE (t) =
√
PwHE
(
hEx (t)+ nE (t)
)
, (10)
where P denotes the transmit power at satellite, the amplitude
of x (t) is normalized to one, namely, E
[|x (t)|2] = 1, and
wB ∈ CNB×1 and wE ∈ CNE×1 are the beamforming (BF)
weight vectors at Bob and Eve, respectively. Meanwhile,
nB (t) ∼ NC
(
0, σB2
)
and nE (t) ∼ NC
(
0, σE 2
)
represent
zeromean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob and
Eve, respectively.
Similar to most related work such as [4]–[9], we con-
sider that perfect CSI is available at each of the terminals.
Thus, by employing MRC, namely, wB = hB
/∥∥hB∥∥F and
wE = hE
/∥∥hE∥∥F , the instantaneous received signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) at Bob and Eve can be, respectively, expressed as
γB =
P
σB
∥∥hB∥∥2F = γ¯B ∥∥hB∥∥2F , (11)
γE =
P
σE
∥∥hE∥∥2F = γ¯E ∥∥hE∥∥2F , (12)
where γ¯B = Pb (ϕB)
/
σB and γ¯E = Pb (ϕE )
/
σE denote,
respectively, the average SNR of the Sat-Bob and Sat-Eve
links.
C. SECRECY RATE
Secure data transmission between Sat and Bob can be
achieved under the condition that the quality of the main
channel is better than that of eavesdropper’s channel. Accord-
ing to [26] and [28], the achievable secrecy rate for the
wiretap channel considered here is
CS =
{
CB − CE , γB > γE
0, γB ≤ γE , (13)
where CB = log2
(
1+ γB
)
and CE = log2
(
1+ γE
)
are
the channel capacities of legitimate user and eavesdropper,
respectively.
The information-theoretic based analysis are the funda-
mentals of physical layer security technique in both satellite
and terrestrial communications. In what follows, depending
on whether Eve’s CSI is available at the satellite, we will
investigate the secrecy performance of the LMS communi-
cation systems for the two different scenarios. In particular,
we will analyze the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity,
and derive the exact and asymptotic secrecy outage proba-
bilities for Scenario I, and the exact and asymptotic average
secrecy capacity for Scenario II, respectively.
III. STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF SATELLITE LINKS
In this section, we study the statistical properties of satellite
links, which are useful for the subsequent derivations of our
analytical expressions. According to [30], an exact analytical
expression for the probability density function (PDF) of γi =
γ¯i ‖hi‖2F , i ∈ {B,E} , is given by
fγi (x)
= αNii
ci∑
li=0
(
ci
li
)
β
ci−li
i
[(
xdi−li−1
γ¯
di−li
i 0
(
di − li
)
)
×1F1
(
di; di−li;−
(
βi−δi
)
γ¯i
x
)
+ εiδix
di−li
γ¯
di−li+1
i 0
(
di − li + 1
)
× 1F1
(
di + 1; di − li + 1;−
(
βi − δi
)
γ¯i
x
)]
(14)
where 1F1 (a; b; c) represents the confluent hypergeometric
function [31, eq. (9.210.1)], αi, βi and δi are given by
αi = 2bimi
/
(2bimi +i)mi
/
2bi (15a)
βi = 1
/
2bi (15b)
δi = i
/
2bi (2bimi +i), (15c)
with ci = (di−Ni)+, εi = miNi−di, di = max {Ni, bmiNic},
where bzc is the largest integer not greater than z, and (z)+
indicates that if z<0, then let (z)+=0.
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For simplicity, we suppose that the Nakagami channel
parameter m takes on integer values, i.e. mi ∈ N [7]. Under
this assumption, we adopt the following identity [32]
1F1 (a; a− n; z) = (−1)
n n!
(1− a)n
exp (z)La−n−1n (−z) , (16)
with (x)n = x (x + 1) (x + n− 1) representing the
Pochhammer symbol and Lαn (·) the Laguerre polynomial,
which can be represented as [31, eq. (8.970.1)]
Lαn (z) =
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
n+ α
n− m
)
zm
m! . (17)
As such we can obtain the following expressions
1F1
(
di; di−li;−
(
βi − δi
)
γ¯i
x
)
= (−1)
li li!(
1−di
)
li
li∑
ki=0
(−1)ki
ki!
×
(
di − 1
li − ki
)((
βi − δi
)
x
γ¯i
)ki
e
− (βi−δi)
γ¯i
x
, (18)
1F1
(
di+1; di−li+1;−
(
βi−δi
)
γ¯i
x
)
= (−1)
li li!(−di)li
li∑
ki=0
(−1)ki
ki!
×
(
di
li − ki
)((
βi − δi
)
x
γ¯i
)ki
e
− (βi−δi)
γ¯i
x
. (19)
Hence, substituting (18) and (19) into (14), we have
fγi (x) = αNii
ci∑
li=0
(
ci
li
)
β
ci−li
i
[Pi (x, li, di, γ¯i)
+εiδiP
(
x, li, di + 1, γ¯i
)]
, (20)
where Pi
(
x, li, di, γ¯i
)
can be written as
Pi
(
x, li, di, γ¯i
) = (−1)
0
(
di − li
) (
1− di
)
li
li∑
ki=0
(−1)li+ki
ki!
×
(
di − 1
li − ki
) (
βi − δi
)ki
γ¯
ki+di−li
i
xki+di−li−1e−
(βi−δi)
γ¯i
x
. (21)
In addition, by using (20) along with [31, eq. (3.351.1)],
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γi = γ¯i ‖hi‖2F
can be expressed as
Fγi (x) = αNii
ci∑
li=0
(
ci
li
)
β
ci−li
i
[Qi (x, li, di, γ¯i)
+εiδiQi
(
x, li, di + 1, γ¯i
)]
, (22)
where Qi
(
x, li, di, γ¯i
)
is given by
Qi
(
x, li, di, γ¯i
)= li!(βi−δi)li−di
0
(
di − li
) (
1− di
)
li
li∑
ki=0
(−1)li+ki
ki!
×
(
di − 1
li − ki
)
γ
(
ki + di − li,
(
βi − δi
)
γ¯i
)
, (23)
and where γ (·, ·) is the lower incomplete Gamma function
[31, eq. (8.350.1)].
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO I
For Scenario I, since the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel
is unavailable at Alice, and similar to [18] and [19], we adopt
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, and the exact and
asymptotic secrecy outage probability to evaluate the secrecy
performance of the network.
Pr
(
Cs > 0
) = αNEE cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
β
cE−lE
E α
NB
B
cB∑
lB=0
(
cB
lB
)
β
cB−lB
B
[U (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E)
+εBδBU
(
lB, dB + 1, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E
)+ εEδEU (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE + 1, γ¯E)
+εBδBεEδEU
(
lB, dB + 1, γ¯B, lE , dE + 1, γ¯E
)]
. (25)
U (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E) = (βE − δE)lE−dE lE !
0
(
dE − lE
) (
1− dE
)
lE
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)lE+kE
kE !
(
dE − 1
lE − kE
)
× lB!
0
(
dB − lB
) (
1− dB
)
lB
lB∑
kB=0
(−1)lB+kB
kB!
(
dB − 1
lB − kB
)(
βB − δB
)kB
γ¯
kB+dB−lB
B
×
∫ ∞
0
xkB+dB−lB−1γ
(
kE + dE − lE ,
(
βE − δE
)
γ¯E
x
)
e
− (βB−δB)
γ¯B
x
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
. (27)
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A. PROBABILITY OF NON-ZERO SECRECY CAPACITY
In wireless networks, channel quality may vary over time and
frequency, a property that can be opportunistically exploited
for improved transmission [18]. Therefore, we consider the
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, which can be given
by
Pr
(
Cs > 0
) = Pr (γB > γE )
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ x
0
fγB (x) fγE (y) dydx
=
∫ ∞
0
FγE (x) fγB (x) dx. (24)
By substituting (20) and (22) into (24), Pr
(
Cs > 0
)
can be
computed as in (25), as shown at the bottom of the previous
page, where U
(
lB, dB, lE , dE
)
is given by
U (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E) = ∫ ∞
0
QE
(
x, lE , dE , γ¯E
)
×PB
(
x, lB, dB, γ¯B
)
dx. (26)
Substituting (21) and (23) into (26), U (lB, dB, lE , dE) can
be calculated as (27). To solve the integral I1 as (27), as
shown at the bottom of the previous page, we first employ
[33, eq. (8.4.16.1)] to express the incomplete gamma function
γ
(
kE + dE − lE , (βE−δE)γ¯E x
)
as
γ
(
kE + dE − lE ,
(
βE − δE
)
γ¯E
x
)
= G1,11,2
[(
βE − δE
)
γ¯E
x
∣∣∣∣ 1kE + dE − lE + 1, 0
]
, (28)
where Gm,np,q [· |· ] is the Meijer-G function of a single variable
[31, eq. (9.301)]. Furthermore, substituting (28) into (27) and
using [31, eq. (7.813.1)], we obtain
I1 =
(
γ¯B
βB − δB
)kB+dB−lB
×G1,22,2
[(
βE−δE
)
γ¯B(
βB−δB
)
γ¯E
∣∣∣∣− (kB + dB − lB − 1) , 1kE + dE − lE + 1, 0
]
,
(29)
and further express (27) as (30), as shown at the bottom of this
page. By substituting (30) into (25), the probability of non-
zero secrecy capacity Pr
(
Cs > 0
)
can be directly calculated.
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The secrecy outage probability can be defined as the proba-
bility that the secrecy capacity falls below a predefined rate
Rs. Mathematically, it is given by [18]
Pout
(
Rs
) = Pr (Cs < Rs) . (31)
Based on (13), we can further rewrite (31) as
Pout
(
Rs
) = Pr (Cs < Rs∣∣ γB > γE)Pr (γB > γE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
+Pr (γB < γE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I4
, (32)
where I3 and I4 in (32) can be calculated as
I3 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+y)−1
y
fγB (x)fγE (y) dxdy (33)
I4 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ y
0
fγB (x)fγE (y) dxdy. (34)
Using (33) and (34) in (32) along with some algebraic
manipulations, we have
Pout
(
Rs
) = ∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+y)−1
0
fγB (x) fγE (y)dxdy
=
∫ ∞
0
FγB
(
2Rs (1+ y)− 1
)
fγE (y) dy. (35)
By substituting (20) and (22) into (35), Pout
(
Rs
)
can be
derived as in (36), as shown at the top of the next page,
where V
(
lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E
)
is given by (37), as shown
at the top of the next page. To solve the integral I5 in
(37) which involves an incomplete gamma function with a
shift parameter, we first apply [31, eq. (8.352.6)] to express
the γ
(
kB + dB − lB, 2Rs (1+ y)− 1
)
as a finite series rep-
resentation along with the binominal expression (a+ x)n =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xkan−k [27, eq. (1.111)], we may write
I5 =
(
kB + dB − lB − 1
)!
×
1− e− (βB−δB)
(
2Rs−1
)
γ¯B ×
kB+dB−lB−1∑
τB=0
1
τB!
(
βB−δB
γ¯B
)τB
τB∑
ζB=0
(
τB
ζB
)
2ζBRs γ¯
ζB
E
(
ζB + kE + dE − lE − 1
)!(
2Rs − 1)ζB−τB (βE − δE)ζB+dE−lE
 .
(38)
U (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E) = (−1)lE (βE − δE)lE−dE lE !
0
(
dE − lE
) (
1− dE
)
lE
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)kE
kE !
(
dE − 1
lE − kE
)
(−1)lB lB!
0
(
dB − lB
) (
1− dB
)
lB
×
lB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
kB!
(
βB − δB
)dB−lB
(
dB − 1
lB − kB
)
G1,22,2
[(
βE − δE
)
γ¯B(
βB − δB
)
γ¯E
∣∣∣∣− (kB + dB − lB − 1) , 1kE + dE − lE + 1, 0
]
. (30)
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Pout
(
Rs
) = αNEE cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
β
cE−lE
E α
NB
B
cB∑
lB=0
(
cB
lB
)
β
cB−lB
B
[V (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E)
+εBδBV
(
lB, dB + 1, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E
)+ εEδEV (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE + 1, γ¯E)
+εBδBεEδEV
(
lB, dB + 1, γ¯B, lE , dE + 1, γ¯E
)]
. (36)
V (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E) = lB!(βB − δB)lB−dB
0
(
dB − lB
) (
1− dB
)
lB
lB∑
kB=0
(−1)lB+kB
kB!
(
dB − 1
lB − kB
)
lE !
0
(
dE − lE
) (
1− dE
)
lE
×
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)lE+kE
kE !
(
dE − 1
lE − kE
) (
βE − δE
)kE
γ¯
kE+dE−lE
E
∫ ∞
0
ykE+dE−lE−1e−
(βE−δE)
γ¯E
y
γ
(
kB + dB − lB, 2Rs (1+ y)− 1
)
dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
I5
, (37)
V (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E) = (−1) lB!(βB − δB)lB−dB
0
(
dB − lB
) (
1− dB
)
lB
lB∑
kB=0
(−1)lB+kB
kB!
(
dB − 1
lB − kB
)
(−1)li lE !
0
(
dE − lE
) (
1− dE
)
lE
×
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)kE
kE !
(
dE − 1
lE − kE
) (
kB + dB − lB − 1
)!
1− e− (βB−δB)
(
2Rs−1
)
γ¯B
kB+dB−lB−1∑
τB=0
1
τB!
×
(
βB − δB
γ¯B
)τB τB∑
ζB=0
(
τB
ζB
)
2ζBRs γ¯
ζB
E
(
ζB + kE + dE − lE − 1
)!(
2Rs − 1)ζB−τB (βE − δE)ζB+dE−lE
 . (39)
In deriving (38), we have used [31, eq. (3.351.3)]. Then,
by inserting (38) into (37), V (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E) can be
obtained as in (34). Eventually, by substituting (39), as shown
at the top of this page into (37) and performing some nec-
essary manipulations, one can directly obtain a closed-form
expression for Pout
(
Rs
)
.
C. ASYMPTOTIC SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
Although an exact analytical expression for secrecy outage
probability has been obtained, it is difficult to gain much
insight from (36). Therefore, in what follows, we will derive
the asymptotic secrecy outage probability at high SNR, where
P → ∞ (approaching Tx saturation). We take into account
two realistic cases, i.e., Outside Beam Coverage (OBC): Eve
is located outside the beam coverage, which can be mathe-
matically described as γ¯B →∞ for arbitrary small γ¯E since
Eve is relatively far away from the legitimate user [19], and
Inside Beam Coverage (IBC): Eve is located within the beam
coverage, which can be view as γ¯B → ∞ and γ¯E → ∞
since Eve is close to the legitimate user [19]. For both cases,
we can reveal two important performance metrics, namely
the secrecy diversity order and the secrecy array gain of the
network.
1) OUTSIDE BEAM COVERAGE (OBC): γ¯B →∞
When the Eve is located far away from the legitimate user, the
secrecy outage probability can be obtained in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The asymptotic secrecy outage probability for
case a) at high SNR can be expressed as
P∞out
(
Rs
) = 4γ¯−NBB , (40)
where
4 = α
NB
B (−1)cB cB!
0
(
NB + 1
) (
1− dB
)
cB
(
dB − 1
cB
)
×αNEE
cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
β
cE−lE
E
[W (lB, dB, lE , dE , γ¯E)
+εEδEW
(
lB, dB, lE , dE + 1, γ¯E
)]
. (41)
with
W (lB, dB, lE , dE , γ¯E)
= lE !
0
(
dE − lE
) (
1− dE
)
lE
×
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)lE+kE
kE !
(
dE − 1
lE − kE
) NB∑
ϕ=0
(
NB
ϕ
)
× 2
ϕRs γ¯
ϕ
E
(
ϕ + kE + dE − lE − 1
)!(
2Rs − 1)ϕ−NB (βE − δE)ϕ+dE−lE . (42)
Proof: See Appendix A.
According to [18] and [19], we can express the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability in terms of the secrecy diversity
order Gd and the secrecy array gain Ga, namely
P∞out
(
Rs
) = (Gcγ¯B)−Gd . (43)
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C¯s = αNEE
cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
β
cE−lE
E α
NB
B
cB∑
lB=0
(
cB
lB
)
β
cB−lB
B
[X (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E)
+εBδBX
(
lB, dB + 1, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E
)+ εEδEX (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE + 1, γ¯E)
+εBδBεEδEX
(
lB, dB + 1, γ¯B, lE , dE + 1, γ¯E
)]
. (51)
X (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E)= (βE−δE)lE−dE lE !
0
(
dE − lE
) (
1− dE
)
lE
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)lE+kE
kE !
(
dE − 1
lE − kE
)
lB!
0
(
dB − lB
) (
1− dB
)
lB
lB∑
kB=0
(−1)lB+kB
kB!
×
(
dB−1
lB−kB
) kB+dB−lB−1∑
τB=0
0
(
kB + dB − lB
)
τB!
(
βB − δB
)dB−lB−τB γ¯ τBB
∫ ∞
0
yτB
1+ yγ
(
kE + dE − lE ,
(
βE − δE
)
γ¯E
y
)
e
− (βB−δE)
γ¯E
y
dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
I6
. (52)
Based on (43), the achievable secrecy diversity order and
secrecy array gain can be directly obtained as
Gd = NB, and Ga = 4
− 1NB . (44)
Remark 1: It can be seen that the achievable secrecy
diversity order Gd of the considered network is only deter-
mined by the number of antennas NB at Bob. However, while
the number of antennas NE at Eve, and the channel parame-
ters of both Bob and Eve,
(
B, bB,mB
)
and
(
E , bE ,mE
)
do
not affect the secrecy diversity order, they have an impact on
the secrecy array gain of the LMS system.
2) IBC: γ¯B →∞ AND γ¯E →∞
In this case, the Eve is located close to the legitimate
user. Based on (43) and by applying the fact γ¯B
/
γ¯E =
b (ϕB)
/
b (ϕE ), the asymptotic secrecy outage probability for
the IBC case is derived as
P∞out
(
Rs
) = lim
γ¯E→∞
P∞out,a
(
Rs
) = 2( b (ϕB)
b (ϕE )
)−NB
, (45)
where
2 = α
NB
B (−1)cB cB!
0
(
NB + 1
) (
1− dB
)
cB
(
dB − 1
cB
)
×αNEE
cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
β
cE−lE
E
[
J
(
lB, dB, lE , dE
)
+εEδEJ
(
lB, dB, lE , dE + 1
)]
, (46)
with
J
(
lB, dB, lE , dE
) = lE !
0
(
dE − lE
) (
1− dE
)
lE
×
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)lE+kE
kE !
(
dE − 1
lE − kE
)
×2
NBRs
(
NB + kE + dE − lE − 1
)!(
βE − δE
)NB+dE−lE .
(47)
Remark 2: As can be observed from (45), the achievable
secrecy diversity order Gd for the IBC case approaches a
constant in the high SNR regime, implying that the secrecy
diversity is zero. The SNR ratio between Bob and Eve is
only determined by the beam gains b (ϕB) and b (ϕE ), which
indicates that increasing the satellite transmit power cannot
enhance the secrecy performance.
V. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO II
This section focuses on the scenario where the CSI of Eve
is available at Alice. In this case, we employ the exact and
asymptotic average secrecy capacity as the principle secrecy
performance metric [16], [19].
A. AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY
Based on the definition of the achievable average secrecy
capacity, we have
C¯s = E
[
Cs
] = ∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
CsfγB,γE (x, y)dxdy (48)
where fγB,γE (x, y) is the joint PDF of γB and γE . Due to the
independence of the main and eavesdropper’s channels, using
(13) in (48) yields
C¯s =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
y
[
log2 (1+ x)− log2 (1+ y)
]
×fγE (y) fγB (x) dydx. (49)
Employing integration by parts along with some other alge-
braic manipulations, (49) can be rewritten as
C¯s = 1ln 2
∫ ∞
0
FγE (y)
1+ y
[∫ ∞
y
fγB (x) dx
]
dy. (50)
Then, by substituting (20) and (22) into (50), C¯s can be
evaluated as in (51), as shown at the top of this page, where
X (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E) can be calculated as in (52), as
shown at the top of this page. In order to compute the integral
I6 in (45), we first exploit (20) and the equality [34, eq.(10)]
(1+ αx)−β = 1
0 (β)
G1,11,1
[
αx
∣∣∣∣ 1− β0
]
. (53)
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X (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E)= (βE−δE)lE−dE lE !
0
(
dE−lE
) (
1−dE
)
lE
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)lE+kE
kE !
(
dE−1
lE−kE
)
lB!
0
(
dB−lB
) (
1−dB
)
lB
lB∑
kB=0
(−1)lB+kB
kB!
×
(
dB − 1
lB − kB
) kB+dB−lB−1∑
τB=0
0
(
kB + dB − lB
)
γ¯B
τB!
(
βB − δB
)dB−lB+1G1,1,1,1,11,[1:1],0,[2:1]
 (βE−δE)γ¯B(βB−δB)γ¯Eγ¯B
βB−δB
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
τB + 1
1; 0
−−
kE + dE − lE + 1, 0; 0
 . (55)
Then, with the aid of [35, eq. (3.1)], we obtain I6 as
I6 =
(
γ¯B
βB − δB
)τB+1
×G1,1,1,1,11,[1:1],0,[2:1]
 (βE−δE)γ¯B(βB−δB)γ¯Eγ¯B
βB−δB
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
τB+1
1; 0
−−
kE+dE−lE+1, 0; 0
 ,
(54)
where G1,1,1,1,11,[1:1],0,[2:1] [· |· ] denotes the Meijer-G function
of two variables [35]. Subsequently, by substituting (54)
into (52), X (lB, dB, γ¯B, lE , dE , γ¯E) can be expressed as
in (55), as shown at the top of this page. Finally, by substi-
tuting (55) into (51) and performing some algebraic manipu-
lations, Cs can be directly evaluated.
B. ASYMPTOTIC AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY
AT HIGH SNR
To investigate the impact of key system parameters, such
as the number of antennas at Bob and Eve and the channel
parameters of hB and hE on the average secrecy capacity, we
focus on the asymptotic secrecy capacity of the system at high
SNR in the following cases.
1) OBC: γ¯B →∞
Before delving into the detailed analysis, applying the iden-
tity [31, eq. (3.351.2)], we first rewrite the CDF of γE as
FγE (x) = 1−8γE (x) (56)
where
8γE (x) = α
NE
E
cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
β
cE−lE
E
× [RE (x, lE , dE , γ¯E) +εEδERE (x, lE , dE + 1, γ¯E)] (57)
and
[RE (x, lE , dE , γ¯E) is given by
RE
(
x, lE , dE , γ¯E
)
= lE !
0
(
dE − lE
) (
1− dE
)
lE
×
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)lE+kE
kE !
(
dE − 1
lE − kE
)
×
kE+dE−lE−1∑
τE=0
0
(
kE + dE − lE
)
τE !
(
βE − δE
)dE−lE−τE γ¯ τEE xτE e
− (βE−δE)
γ¯E
x
.
(58)
Then, using (56) in (50) and changing the order of integra-
tion, we further have
C¯∞s =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
[∫ x
0
1−8γE (y)
1+ y dy
]
fγB (x) dx=31−32
(59)
where 31 and 32 can be written as
31 = 1ln 2
∫ ∞
0
ln (1+ x)fγB (x) dx (60)
32 = 1ln 2
∫ ∞
0
∫ x
0
1γE (y)
1+ y fγB (x) dydx. (61)
Next, we will derive 3i(i = 1, 2) in the high SNR regime.
When x → ∞, we have ln (1+ x) ≈ ln x. By substituting
(58) into (60), and applying [31, eq. (4.352.1)], one can obtain
3∞1 = αNBB
cB∑
lB=0
(
cB
lB
)
β
cB−lB
B
[GB (lB, dB, γ¯B)
+εBδBGB
(
lB, dB + 1, γ¯B
)]+ log2γ¯B, (62)
where GB
(
lB, dB, γ¯B
)
is given by
GB
(
lB, dB + 1, γ¯B
)
= (−1)
lB
B lB!
0
(
dB − lB + 1
) (−dB)lB
×
lB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
kB!
(
dB
lB − kB
)
0
(
kB + dB − lB + 1
)(
βB − δB
)dB−lB+1
× [ψ (kB + dB − lB + 1)− ln (βB − δB)] , (63)
and ψ (·) is the digamma function [31]. Resorting to [18],
the asymptotic expression for 3∞2 can be calculated as
3∞2 =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
8γE (x)
1+ x dx. (64)
Hence, combining (57) and (64) alongwith [36, eq. (2.3.6.9)],
we obtain
3∞2 = αNEE
cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
β
cE−lE
E
[TE (lE , dE , γ¯E)
+εEδETE
(
lE , dE + 1, γ¯E
)]
, (65)
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C∞s = αNBB
cB∑
lB=0
(
cB
lB
)
β
cB−lB
B
[GB (lB, dB, γ¯B) +εBδBGB (lB, dB + 1, γ¯B)]+ log2γ¯B
−αNEE
cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
β
cE−lE
E
[TE (lE , dE , γ¯E) +εEδETE (x, lE , dE + 1, γ¯E)] . (67)
where
TE
(
lE , dE , γ¯E
)
= (−1)
lE lE !
0
(
dE − lE
) (
1− dE
)
lE
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)kE
kE !
×
(
dE − 1
lE − kE
) kE+dE−lE−1∑
τE=0
0
(
kE + dE − lE
)
τE !
(
βE − δE
)dE−lE−τE γ¯ τEE
×0 (τE + 1)U
(
τE + 1, τE + 1;
(
βE − δE
)
γ¯E
)
. (66)
with U (·, ·; ·) being the confluent hypergeometric func-
tion [31]. Eventually, by using (62) and (65) in (59),
the asymptotic average secrecy capacity of the system for the
OBC case can be evaluated as in (67), as shown at the top of
this page.
To gain insight on the average secrecy capacity at high
SNR, the slope and power offset at the high SNR are also
needed to be analyzed. To facilitate the asymptotic analysis,
we adopt the general form in [37] to express C∞s as
C∞s = S∞
(
log2 γ¯B − L∞
)
, (68)
where S∞ denotes the high SNR slope in bit/s/Hz (3dB) and
L∞ the high SNR power offset in 3dB units.
According to [38], by substituting (67) into (68) along with
algebraic manipulations, the high SNR slope is given by
S∞ = lim
γ¯B→∞
C∞s
log2 γ¯B
= 1 (69)
Furthermore, the high SNR power offset can be expressed as
L∞ = lim
γ¯B→∞
(
log2 γ¯B −
C∞s
S∞
)
. (70)
Hence, substituting (68) and (69) into (70), we have
L∞ = LB∞ + LE∞, (71)
where the first term LB∞, which shows the effect of the Sat-
Bob channel parameters on the average secrecy capacity,
is given by
LB∞ = −αNBB
cB∑
lB=0
(
cB
lB
)
β
cB−lB
B
× [GB (lB, dB, γ¯B) +εBδBGB (lB, dB + 1, γ¯B)] , (72)
and the second term LE∞, which characterizes the impact of
the eavesdropping link on the average secrecy capacity, can
be expressed as
LE∞ = αNEE
cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
β
cE−lE
E
[TE (lE , dE , γ¯E)
+εEδETE
(
lE , dE + 1, γ¯E
)]
. (73)
Remark 3: As can be seen from (69) that the slop always
equals to one at the high SNR, which means system param-
eters, such as NB, NE ,
(
B, bB,mB
)
and
(
E , bE ,mE
)
have
no impact on S∞. Morever, the effects of the main channel
parameters and eavesdropper link condition on the average
secrecy capacity can be characterized with the aid of the
high SNR power offset component LB∞ given in (72) and LE∞
in (73), respectively.
2) IBC: γ¯B →∞ AND γ¯E →∞
In this case, we first need to further provide the asymptotic
3∞2 with γ¯E →∞.
3˜∞2 = lim
γ¯E→∞
3∞2 = log2γ¯E + αNEE
cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
β
cE−lE
E
× [IE (lE , dE) +εEδEIE (lE , dE + 1)] , (74)
where
IE
(
lE , dE + 1
)
= (−1)
lE
E lE !
0
(
dE − lE + 1
) (−dE)lE
×
lE∑
kE=0
(−1)kE
kE !
(
dE
lE − kE
)
0
(
kE + dE − lE + 1
)(
βE − δE
)dE−lE+1
× [ψ (kE + dE − lE + 1)− ln (βE − δE)] , (75)
Then, by combining (71) and (74), the asymptotic average
secrecy capacity for case b) can be computed as
C∞s = log2
(
b (ϕB)
b (ϕE )
)
+ αNBB
cB∑
lB=0
(
cB
lB
)
β
cB−lB
B
× [GB (lB, dB) +εBδBGB (lB, dB + 1)]− αNEE cE∑
lE=0
(
cE
lE
)
×βcE−lEE
[IE (lE , dE) +εEδEIE (lE , dE + 1)] . (76)
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Remark 4: Based on (76), it can be found that the high
SNR slope equals zero. This observation is consistent with
(45) that the achievable average secrecy capacity cannot be
enhanced by increasing the satellite transmit power when Eve
is located close to the legitimate user.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical simulations to examine
the validity of the performance analysis and the impact of var-
ious system parameters on the network. Here, the predefined
rate is chosen as Rs = 1, the simulation results are obtained
by performing 106 channel realizations, and the different
shadowing severities of themain and eavesdropper’s channels
hi ∼ SR
(
i, bi,mi
)
(i ∈ {B,E}) are given in Table I.Without
loss of generality, we assume the legitimate receiver is located
at the center of the central beam, namely, dB = 0 (maximum
beam gain direction) [2], [21].
TABLE 1. LMS channel parameters [27], [30]
A. IMPACT OF BEAM RADIUS AND EVE’S POSITION
To begin with, we investigate the impact of different beam
radii R and eavesdropper positions dE on the secrecy perfor-
mance of the LMS network. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 depict, respec-
tively, the secrecy outage probability and average secrecy
capacity of the satellite network for different R and dE . First
of all, it is observed that the theoretical results are in excellent
agreement with the Monte Carlo simulations, implying the
validity of the secrecy performance analysis. Next, as we see
from Fig. 2, for fixed dE , the secrecy outage probability is
reduced with the decrease of beam radius R. Specifically,
when Eve’s position is outside the beam coverage, the secrecy
outage probability of the LMS system gradually fluctuates
within a certain range around 10−3 and 10−6. This means that
the narrower the beam pattern of the satellite antenna feed,
the better secrecy performance is obtained. Finally, as shown
in Fig. 3, whenR is fixed, the average secrecy capacity rapidly
improves with the increase of dE , and gradually remains
stable between 6 and 7.
B. IMPACT OF KEY SYSTEM PARAMETERS
In what follows, we focus on the impact of various key
system parameters, including the number of antennas at the
legitimate user and eavesdropper, and the channel shadowing
severities on the secrecy performance of the satellite network.
1) OBC
When Eve is located away from the legitimate user,
the received average SNR at Eve is relatively small and can
be viewed as a constant for the convenience of analysis. First
of all, assuming both the Sat-Bob and Sat-Eve channels are
FIGURE 2. Secrecy outage probability with respective to different R and
dE (NB = NE = 2, hB and hE : ILS scenario, P/σ2 = 20 dB).
FIGURE 3. Average Secrecy Capacity with respective to different R and
dE (NB = NE = 2, hB and hE : ILS scenario, P/σ2 = 20 dB).
subject to the AS scenario, Fig. 4 depicts the probability of
non-zero secrecy capacity versus γ¯B for different values of
Eve’s average SNR γ¯E . As shown in the figure, the theoret-
ical results are in excellent agreement with the Monte Carlo
simulations, which validates the accuracy of the derivations.
In addition, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
degrades significantly with an increase in Eve’s average SNR
γ¯E , which indicates the negative effect of the received power
at the eavesdropper.
Fig. 5 investigates the effect of the number of antennas
at Bob and Eve on the secrecy outage probability of the
system, where both the Sat-Bob and Sat-Eve links follow
the AS scenario. All of the analytical curves of secrecy out-
age probability agree well with simulation results, and the
asymptotic results are very tight in the high SNR regime,
implying the validity of the derived expressions. We also
see that NB has a significant positive impact on the secrecy
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FIGURE 4. The probability of the non-zero secrecy capacity versus γ¯B with
different γ¯E (hB and hE : ILS scenario).
FIGURE 5. Secrecy outage probability versus γ¯B for different antenna
configurations (hB and hE : ILS scenario, γ¯E = 5dB).
performance, justifying the benefits of employing multiple
antennas in enhancing the secrecy of LMS systems. More-
over, it can be observed that the secrecy diversity order of
the system only depends on the number of antennas at Bob,
which corroborates the observation in Remark I. Meanwhile,
although an increase in NE does not influence the achievable
secrecy diversity order, it does degrade the system secrecy
performance by reducing the secrecy array gain.
Fig. 6 illustrates the secrecy outage probability versus γ¯B
for different levels of shadowing of the Sat-Bob and Sat-
Eve channels, respectively. It can be seen that the shadowing
severities of both Bob and Eve do not influence the achiev-
able secrecy diversity order of the system. However, weaker
shadowing for the main channel results in a reduced secrecy
outage probability by improving the secrecy array gain.
On the other hand, the secrecy performance will be severely
degraded by a weaker shadowing on the eavesdropper
channel due to the reduction of secrecy array gain. Note that
FIGURE 6. Secrecy outage probability versus γ¯B for different shadowing
severities (NB = NE = 2, γ¯E = 5dB).
FIGURE 7. Average secrecy capacity versus γ¯B for different antenna
configurations (hB and hE : ILS scenario, γ¯E = 5dB).
the secrecy performance of the LMS network improves as
the shadowing becomes less severe for both receivers. This
occurs due to the fact that, as the LOS component becomes
stronger, the random variation in the channel is reduced, and
hence the probability that Eve’s channel will be better than
Bob’s will also be correspondingly reduced, especially if
Bob’s channel is already on average stronger than Eve’s.
In Figs. 7 and 8, the average security capacity of the
proposed system with various antenna configurations and
shadowing severity are illustrated, respectively. As shown in
these figures, at the high SNR, the slope of S∞ is always
being one in all cases, which matches well with the formula
given in (69). It can be observed from Fig. 7 that the average
secrecy capacity improves when either theNB increases or the
NE decreases. This is because a larger NB can reduce LB∞
given in (72) and further decrease the high SNR power offset,
While a lower NB can directly lead to a larger SNR power
offset LE∞. It can also be seen from Fig. 8 that due to the a
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FIGURE 8. Average secrecy capacity versus γ¯B for different shadowing
severities (NB = NE = 2 and γ¯E = 5dB).
FIGURE 9. Secrecy outage probability for different antenna
configurations (hB and hE : ILS scenario, R = 100 Km, dE = 80 Km).
better channel quality for Bob corresponds to a smaller power
offset LB∞, the average secrecy capacity of the considered
system increases as the main link quality is getting better.
On the other hand, as validated in (73), a better channel
quality for the eavesdropper can degrade the average secrecy
capacity of the proposed system. Consequently, to improve
the secrecy performance of the legitimate user, we should add
more artificial noise on the eavesdropper to weaker its link
condition.
2) IBC
Subsequently, we focus on the cases when Eve is located
close to Bob. Firstly, Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show the secrecy
outage probability for different antenna configurations and
shadowing severity of the Sat-Bob and Sat-Eve channels,
respectively. As predicted in (45), for all the analytical curves,
the secrecy outage probability gradually converges to a finite
lower bound at high SNR, which proves that the achievable
FIGURE 10. Secrecy outage probability for different shadowing severities
(NB = NE = 4, R = 100 Km and dE = 80 Km).
FIGURE 11. Average Secrecy Capacity for different antenna configurations
(hB and hE : ILS scenario, R = 100 Km, dE = 80 Km).
secrecy diversity order collapses to zero when Eve is located
close to the legitimate user. In this case, increasing the trans-
mit power does not provide additional secrecy performance
enhancement, and the various key channel parameters only
affect the secrecy array gain. Another phenomenon that must
be noticed is that the channel shadowing severities of the Eve
link have a greater impact on the system performance even if
Bob’s channel is already on average stronger than Eve’s. This
observation is different from the findings in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6,
where the Eve is located far away from Bob.
Then, Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 plot the average secrecy capacity
for different antenna configurations and shadowing severity.
We can observe that the average secrecy capacity asymptot-
ically approaches an upper bound in the high SNR regime,
which confirms the high SNR slope S∞ equals zero as
suggested by (76). Meanwhile, different channel parameters
improve or reduce the achievable average secrecy capacity by
affecting the high SNR power offset.
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FIGURE 12. Average Secrecy Capacity for different shadowing severities
(NB = NE = 4, R = 100 Km, dE = 80 Km).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a security problem for LMS communication
systems has been studied, where the confidential messages
sent by a single antenna satellite to a multi-antenna legitimate
user are overheard by a multi-antenna eavesdropper. Specif-
ically, two representative scenarios have been considered,
namely, Scenario I: the satellite has no knowledge of the
eavesdropper, and Scenario II: the CSI of the eavesdropper is
available at the satellite. For Scenario I, we derived analytical
expressions for the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity,
and the exact and asymptotic secrecy outage probability of the
network. For scenario II, both the exact and asymptotic aver-
age secrecy capacity were obtained. Finally, numerical results
for both scenarios were provided to validate the theoretical
derivations, and show the impact of various key parameters
on the secrecy performance of the LMS system. For Scenario
I, we demonstrated that the secrecy diversity order of the
system only depends on NB, and an increase in NE only
degrades the secrecy array gain. For Scenario II, we found
that system parameters can only affect the high SNR power
offset, while the slope at the high SNR always remains as one
in all cases. Furthermore, for both scenarios, we noted that an
improved secrecy performance of the satellite system can be
achieved when either the desired user’s channel is stronger on
average than the eavesdropper’s, or the strength of the LOS
component increases. The contributions of this work provide
an intuitive guidance for the system design, performance
evaluation, and implementation of physical layer security in
satellite communication systems.
.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Inspired by the series representation of the incomplete
gamma function [27, eq. (8.354.1)]
γ (α, x) = xα
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n xn
n! (α + n)
x→0≈ x
α
α
, (A.1)
we have the asymptotic CDF of γi as
F∞γi (x) = α
Ni
i
ci∑
li=0
(
ci
li
)
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ci−li
i
(−1)li li!
(
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)li−di
0
(
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) (
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)
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)di−li xdi−li
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. (A.2)
Considering that the asymptotic performance of F∞γi (x)
is determined by the lowest-order terms of γ¯1 at high SNR,
we let li = ci in (A.2), and further obtain
F∞γi (x)=
α
Ni
i (−1)ci ci!
0
(
Ni+1
) (
1− di
)
ci
(
di−1
ci
)
xNi
γ¯
Ni
i
+ O
(
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.
(A.3)
Based on (35), the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
can be expressed as
P∞out
(
Rs
) = ∫ ∞
0
F∞γB
(
2Rs (1+ y)− 1
)
fγE (y) dy (A.4)
Hence, by using (A.3) and (20) in (A.4) and applying
[27, eq. (7.813.1)], P∞out
(
Rs
)
can be derived as shown in
Theorem I.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Vaneli-Corali et al., ‘‘Satellite communications: Research trends and
open issues,’’ in Proc. Int. Workshop Satell. Space Commun. (IWSSC),
Sep. 2007, pp. 71–75.
[2] G. Zheng, et al. ‘‘Generic optimization of linear precoding in multi-
beam satellite systems,’’ IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 11, no. 6,
pp. 2308–2320, Jun. 2012.
[3] D. Christopoulos, S. Chatzinotas, and B. Ottersten, ‘‘Multicast multigroup
precoding and user scheduling for frame-based satellite communications,’’
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 9, pp. 4695–4707, Sep. 2015.
[4] V. K. Sakarellos, C. Kourogiorgas, and A. D. Panagopoulos, ‘‘Coopera-
tive hybrid land mobile satellite–terrestrial broadcasting systems: Outage
probability evaluation and accurate simulation,’’ Wireless Pers. Commun.,
vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 1471–1481, Nov. 2014.
[5] K. An et al. ‘‘Symbol error analysis of hybrid Satellite-terrestrial coopera-
tive networks with co-channel interference,’’ IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 18,
no. 11, pp. 1947–1950, Nov. 2014.
[6] K. P. Liolis, A. D. Panagopoulos, and P. G. Cottis, ‘‘Multi-satellite MIMO
communications at Ku-band and above: Investigations on spatial multi-
plexing for capacity improvement and selection diversity for interference
mitigation,’’ EURASIP J. Wireless Commun. Netw., vol. 2007, Dec. 2007,
Art. no. 059608.
[7] N. I. Miridakis, D. D. Vergados, and A. Michalas, ‘‘Dual-hop communica-
tion over a satellite relay and shadowed rician channels,’’ IEEE Trans. Veh.
Technol., vol. 64, no. 9, pp. 4031–4040, Sep. 2015.
[8] K. An, M. Lin, W.-P. Zhu, Y. Huang, and G. Zheng, ‘‘Outage perfor-
mance of cognitive hybrid satellite–terrestrial networks with interference
constraint,’’ IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 65, no. 11, pp. 9397–9404,
Nov. 2016.
[9] K. An et al., ‘‘Performance analysis of multi-antenna hybrid satellite-
terrestrial relay networks in the presence of interference,’’ IEEE Trans.
Commun., vol. 63, no. 11, pp. 4390–4404, Nov. 2015.
[10] A. Roy-Chowdhury, J. S. Baras, M. Hadjitheodosiou, and
S. Papademetriou, ‘‘Security issues in hybrid networks with a satellite
component,’’ IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 50–61,
Dec. 2005.
[11] H. Cruickshank, M. P. Howarth, S. Iyengar, Z. Sun, and L. Claverotte,
‘‘Securing multicast in DVB-RCS satellite systems,’’ IEEE Wireless Com-
mun., vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 38–45, Oct. 2005.
[12] A. Mukherjee, S. A. A. Fakoorian, J. Huang, and A. L. Swindlehurst,
‘‘Principles of physical layer security in multiuser wireless networks:
A survey,’’ IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1550–1573,
Aug. 2014.
VOLUME 6, 2018 39619
K. An et al.: On the Secrecy Performance of Land Mobile Satellite Communication Systems
[13] A. Mukherjee and A. L. Swindlehurst, ‘‘Robust beamforming for security
in MIMO wiretap channels with imperfect CSI,’’ IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 351–361, Jan. 2011.
[14] J. Huang and A. L. Swindlehurst, ‘‘Cooperative jamming for secure com-
munications in MIMO relay networks,’’ IEEE Trans. Signal Process.,
vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 4871–4884, Oct. 2011.
[15] A. D. Wyner, ‘‘The wire-tap channel,’’ Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[16] L. Wang, N. Yang, M. Elkashlan, P. L. Yeoh, and J. Yuan, ‘‘Physical layer
security of maximal ratio combining in two-wave with diffuse power fad-
ing channels,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur., vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 247–258,
Feb. 2014.
[17] A. Chorti, S. M. Perlaza, Z. Han, and H. V. Poor, ‘‘On the resilience of
wireless multiuser networks to passive and active eavesdroppers,’’ IEEE
J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 1850–1863, Sep. 2013.
[18] N. Yang, P. L. Yeoh, M. Elkashlan, R. Schober, and I. B. Collings,
‘‘Transmit antenna selection for security enhancement in MIMO wiretap
channels,’’ IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 144–154, Jan. 2013.
[19] L. Wang, M. Elkashlan, J. Huang, R. Schober, and R. K. Mallik, ‘‘Secure
transmission with antenna selection in MIMO Nakagami-m fading chan-
nels,’’ IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 11, pp. 6054–6067,
Nov. 2014.
[20] J. Lei, Z. Han,M. Á. Vazquez-Castro, and A. Hjorungnes, ‘‘Secure satellite
communication systems design with individual secrecy rate constraints,’’
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 661–671, Sep. 2011.
[21] G. Zheng, P.-D. Arapoglou, and B. Ottersten, ‘‘Physical layer security in
multibeam satellite systems,’’ IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 11,
no. 2, pp. 852–863, Feb. 2012.
[22] A. Kalantari, G. Zheng, Z. Gao, Z. Han, and B. Ottersten, ‘‘Secrecy anal-
ysis on network coding in bidirectional multibeam satellite communica-
tions,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 10, no. 9, pp. 1862–1874,
Sep. 2015.
[23] A. Vazquez-Castro and M. Hayashi, ‘‘Information-theoretic physical layer
security for satellite channels,’’ in Proc. IEEE AERO, Big Sky, MT, USA,
Mar. 2017, pp. 1–14.
[24] B. Li, Z. Fei, X. Xu, and Z. Chu, ‘‘Resource allocations for secure cognitive
satellite-terrestrial networks,’’ IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 7, no. 1,
pp. 78–81, Feb. 2018.
[25] B. Li, Z. Fei, Z. Chu, F. Zhou, K.-K. Wong, and P. Xiao, ‘‘Robust
chance-constrained secure transmission for cognitive satellite–terrestrial
networks,’’ IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 67, no. 5, pp. 4208–4219,
May 2018.
[26] M. Bloch, J. Barros,M. R. D. Rodrigues, and S.W.McLaughlin, ‘‘Wireless
information-theoretic security,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6,
pp. 2515–2534, Jun. 2008.
[27] A. Abdi, W. C. Lau, M. S. Alouini, and M. Kaveh, ‘‘A new simple model
for land mobile satellite channels: First- and second-order statistics,’’ IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 519–528, May 2003.
[28] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, ‘‘Improving wireless
physical layer security via cooperating relays,’’ IEEE Trans. Signal Pro-
cess., vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, Mar. 2010.
[29] J. Arnau, D. Christopoulos, S. Chatzinotas, C. Mosquera, and
B. Ottersten, ‘‘Performance of the multibeam satellite return link
with correlated rain attenuation,’’ IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 13,
no. 11, pp. 6286–6299, Nov. 2014.
[30] M. R. Bhatnagar and M. K. Arti, ‘‘On the closed-form performance
analysis of maximal ratio combining in Shadowed–Rician fading LMS
channels,’’ IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 54–57, Jan. 2014.
[31] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, Table of Integrals, Series, and Products,
7th ed. New York, NY, USA: Academic, 2007.
[32] Accessed: 2015. [Online]. Available: http:functions.wolfram.com/
07.20.03.0007.01
[33] A. P. Prudnikov et al., Integrals and Series: More Special Functions, vol. 3.
New York, NY, USA: Gordon & Breach, 1990.
[34] V. S. Adamchik and O. I. Marichev, ‘‘The algorithm for calculating inte-
grals of hypergeometric type functions and its realization in REDUCE
system,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Symp. Algebr. Comput., 1990, pp. 212–224.
[35] R. P. Agrawal, ‘‘Certain transformation formulae and Meijer’s G function
of two variables,’’ Indian J. Pure Appl. Math., vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 537–551,
1970.
[36] A. P. Prudnikov, Integrals and Series: Elementary Functions, vol. 1.
New York, NY, USA: Gordon & Breach, 1990.
[37] A. Lozano, A. M. Tulino, and S. Verdú, ‘‘High-SNR power offset in
multiantenna communication,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 51, no. 12,
pp. 4134–4151, Dec. 2005.
[38] S. Jin, R. McKay, C. Zhong, and K.-K. Wong, ‘‘Ergodic capacity analysis
of amplify-and-forward MIMO dual-hop systems,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. The-
ory, vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 2204–2224, May 2010.
KANG AN received the B.E. degree in elec-
tronic engineering from the Nanjing University of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China,
in 2011, the M.E. degree in communication engi-
neering from the PLA University of Science
and Technology, Nanjing, China, in 2014, and
the Ph.D. degree in communication engineer-
ing from Army Engineering University, Nanjing,
China, in 2017. Since 2018, he has been with the
Sixty-third/63rd Research Institute, National Uni-
versity of Defense Technology, Nanjing, China, where he is currently an
Engineer. His research interests include satellite communication, cooperative
communication, physical layer security, and cognitive radio.
TAO LIANG received the Ph.D. degree in
computer science and technology from the
Nanjing Institute of Communications Engineer-
ing, Nanjing, China, in 1998. Since 2017, he has
been with the Sixty-third/63rd Research Insti-
tute, National University of Defense Technology,
Nanjing, where he is currently a Research
Fellow. His research interests include satellite
communication, digital signal processing in com-
munications, physical layer security, cooperative
communication, and cognitive network.
XIAOJUAN YAN (S’18) received the B.S. degree
from the Southwest University of Science and
Technology in 2007 and the M.S. degree from
Guangxi University in 2014. She is currently pur-
suing the Ph.D. degree with the School of Infor-
mation and Communications, Guilin University of
Electronic Technology, China. From 2016 to 2017,
she was a Visiting Ph.D. Student with Heriot-Watt
University, Edinburgh, U.K., under the supervision
of Prof. C.-X.Wang. Her current research interests
are in the fields of satellite-terrestrial networks, cooperative communica-
tions, and non-orthogonal multiple access.
GAN ZHENG (S’05–M’09–SM’12) received the
B.Eng. and M.Eng. degrees in electronic and
information engineering from Tianjin University,
China, in 2002 and 2004, respectively, and the
Ph.D. degree in electrical and electronic engi-
neering from The University of Hong Kong,
Hong Kong, in 2008.
He is currently a Senior Lecturer with the Wolf-
son School of Mechanical, Electrical and Manu-
facturing Engineering, Loughborough University,
U.K. His research interests include UAV communications, edge caching,
full-duplex radio, wireless power transfer, cooperative communications,
cognitive radio, and physical-layer security. He was a Best Recipient
of the 2013 IEEE Signal Processing Letters Best Paper Award and the
2015 GLOBECOM Best Paper Award. He currently serves as an Associate
Editor for the IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS.
39620 VOLUME 6, 2018
